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Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolutive Legal Norm 
 
 
Sustainable development has become an unavoidable paradigm that should, as commonly 
accepted, underpin, most, if not all human action(s). It pervades the environmental, social, political, 
economic and cultural discourses from the local through to the ‘global’ level by both the public and 
private sectors. Sustainable development has also widely penetrated the legal domain. This emblematic 
‘concept’1 has found its way into an ever increasing number of international legal instruments. 
Promoted by the United Nations, it is central to a vast number of Resolutions, Declarations, Conventions 
and international judicial decisions. Sustainable development unsurprisingly interests international 
lawyers, but the uncertainty surrounding its nature also sparks their perplexity. Its most cited definition 
is that of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), known as the Brundtland 
Commission, in its landmark report for the dissemination of the concept, which posits it as development 
that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs’.2 Though symbolic, this definition remains relatively unhelpful when it comes to 
providing clues for the legal characterisation of the notion. Coupled with its multifaceted nature – its 
texture will inevitably vary according to who makes use of it and for what purpose - academic 
commentators have dealt with the legal nature of sustainable development with either scepticism or 
suspicion. 
 
For some, the answer to the question of its relationship to the law is straightforward, 
sustainable development does not belong to law; it may be an important philosophical or political 
objective, but it is not a legal one.3 Its connection with the law is restricted to the fact that it may 
contribute to law formation. As a political objective, it will exert an impact on international negotiations 
and as such may influence the content of the law while remaining separate from it. Others avoid the 
issue of ascertaining the legal nature of sustainable development by pointing to its lack of relevance. 
Beyond its potential characterisation as an international legal norm, these commentators argue that a 
more relevant and fruitful approach is to concentrate, not on the legal nature of sustainable 
development itself, but on the various principles essential to its realization and that aggregate 
themselves around this ‘conceptual matrix’.4 A variant of this approach is to consider sustainable 
development, not as a legal principle, but as a new branch of international law altogether.5 A last trend 
that has received considerable support is Lowe’s analysis of sustainable development as an interstitial 
                                                            
1 See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1997) 7, at para 140. 
2 Report of the WCED, Our Common Future (1987) at 51. 
3 See Fievet ‘Réflexions sur le concept de développement durable: prétentions économiques, principes 
stratégiques et protection des droits fondamentaux’, RBDI (2001) 128, at 143. 
4 Expression coined by Dupuy in ‘Où en est le droit international de l’environnement à la fin du siècle?’, 101 RGDIP 
(1997) 873 at 886. For a focus on the principles essential to sustainable development see Sands, ‘International Law 
in the Field of Sustainable Development’, 64 BYIL (1994) 303, at 338-348.  




norm, whereby the concept’s legal relevance is to be found  in the pull it exerts on the judicial reasoning 
process.6 
 
This study aims to revisit sustainable development’s normativity. The pull it exerts on the 
judicial reasoning process, and in the interpretative process generally, is indeed significant and will be 
explored (4), but above and beyond its interpretive functions it is argued that sustainable development, 
in its current shape, does fit within traditional categories of normativity, and this contribution seeks to 
show how it operates as a legal norm. Before ascertaining its legal nature (2), as well as its object and 
material effect as a legal norm (3), a fresh look will be given to its conceptual content (1). 
 
 




Early origins of an intimate connexion between nature preservation (or wise management) and 
economic development - which is at the heart of sustainable development - can be traced back to the 
19th and 18th century.7 But the modern understanding of the concept, and its recognition at the 
International Community level, is largely the result of a vast UN-led promotion operation. This operation 
officially started in 1972 with the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. Although 
‘sustainable development’ was not yet mentioned, the link between environmental protection and 
economic development was clearly established in the Stockholm Declaration of Principles.8  It is some 15 
years later that the expression ‘sustainable development’ was formulated, and a first version of its 
meaning articulated, by the WCED, another UN creation.9 The most fundamental landmark in 
sustainable development’s history is however certainly the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and 
Development and its famous Declaration of Principles which brings sustainable development within the 
legal sphere. Although non-binding, the principles of the Rio Declaration are formulated in strong legal 
terms.10 It is also undeniably a Declaration of legal principles about sustainable development as the 
expression appears in no less than 12 different principles. Consequently, it is viewed as the keystone of 
the conceptual articulation of sustainable development. At Rio, sustainable development, officially 
endorsed by the world community, also became the unavoidable paradigm of 
environment/development relations.  But it was not until 1997 and Rio + 5 that the social (and third) 
                                                            
6 See Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’, in International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, Boyle & Freestone (eds) (1999) 19. 
7 See Sands, supra note 4 at 306, referring to the Pacific Fur Seal Arbitration of 1893 and Sand, ‘Sustainable 
Development – Of Forests, Ships and Law’ 37 Environmental Policy and Law (2007) 2, referring to German Forestry 
Academies of the 18th century. 
8 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, A/CONF.14/48/Rev.1. See particularly principles 4, 13, 15-20. 
9 Although the term ‘sustainable development’ is fully enunciated and disseminated by the Brundtland Report, the 
expression was borrowed from the 1980 World Conservation Strategy (a joint IUCN/WWF/UNEP document). 
10 See principles 2-7, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17-19. 
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pillar of sustainable development was added into the equation when the UN General Assembly affirmed 
that environmental protection, economic development and social development, were three 
interdependent dimensions of sustainable development.11 Such rebalancing of the notion was later 
confirmed and generalised at the Johannesburg Summit for Sustainable Development in 2002, which, 
together with a strong emphasis on implementation, are the core added value of a summit, which 
otherwise failed to replicate the Rio success. It can be doubted whether more will be added, at least 
conceptually, by the Rio + 20 Conference on Sustainable Development scheduled for June 2012.12 If 
anything the lack of emphasis of its agenda on the conceptual content of sustainable development 
underlines that the International Community and the UN consider the matter more or less settled. 
 
The conception, articulation, and dissemination of sustainable development on the international 
plane is thus the result of 20 to 30 years of intense UN-led activity, which, in international law terms, is a 
relatively short time. This is testimony of the International Community’s wide support for sustainable 
development, which, beyond the texts already mentioned, also found its way into a plethora of 
Declarations of States, Resolutions of International Organizations, and crucially, international Treaties.13 
It is these founding texts, and particularly the Rio Declaration, that lay out the core conceptual content 
of sustainable development.  
 
B. Sustainable development = (intergenerational equity + intragenerational equity) X 
integration 
 
A synthesis of these core documents shows that the sense of the proposition ‘sustainable 
development’ can be reduced to the combination of two principles that can be seen as axiomatic to 
understanding sustainable development: intergenerational and intragenerational equity.  
Intergenerational equity14 refers to the first dimension of the proposition and relates to the adjective 
‘sustainable’. This principle is at the core of the Brundtland Report’s definition and is also included in 
principle 3 of the Rio Declaration. It posits that in their development choices, States must preserve the 
environmental capital they hold in trust for future generations and ensure it is transmitted in conditions 
equivalent to those in which it was received. In other words, environmental preservation is necessary to 
ensure equity between generations, without it, the ‘sustainability’ of development cannot be ensured. 
Intragenerational equity15 refers for its part to the second dimension of the expression, the 
‘development’ part, and requires equity in the distribution of the outcomes of development within one 
generation as much internally (within one national society) as internationally (between developed and 
                                                            
11 See GA Res S-19/2, 28 June 1997. 
12 http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?menu=61 accessed on 08/07/2011. 
13 See infra Part 2.  
14 See eg Brown Weiss, ‘Implementing Intergenerational Equity’, in M. Fitzmaurice et al (eds.) Research Handbook 
on International Environmental Law (2010) 100. 
15 See eg French ‘International Environmental Law and the Achievement of Intragenerational Equity’ 31 
Environmental Law Reporter (2001) 469. 
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developing states). However, it is only when they are read together that these two principles confer to 
the expression ‘sustainable development’ its specificity. Development will only be sustainable when 
both intergenerational (environmental protection) and intragenerational (fair economic and social 
development) equity are guaranteed, and this is to be achieved through their integration. This 
requirement is particularly well illustrated in principle 4 of the Rio Declaration which provides: ‘In order 
to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the 
development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.’ Reconciliation of environmental 
protection and economic and social development, through their integration, is commonly seen as the 
core philosophy underlying the concept.16 For some, integration is neither more nor less than 
sustainable development itself.17 However, equating sustainable development to the principle of 
integration would be unduly restrictive. Sustainable development is an objective that the International 
Community must strive to achieve whereas the integration of environmental protection and economic 
and social development is not. Rather, it is the means by which sustainable development will be 
achieved. Hence, rather than being sustainable development, the principle of integration is the key 
technique for its realization. 
 
C. Connected standards and principles 
 
Beyond these essential components of sustainable development, a vast array of legal standards 
and principles are further closely connected to its realization. When implemented, they participate to 
the integration of environmental protection and economic and social development, and thus help 
achieve sustainable development. Some derive from the principle of intergenerational equity, and 
others from intragenerational equity.  Important standards for the realization of sustainable 
development inspired by intragenerational equity include the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities according to which, in view of their particular contribution to the degradation of the 
environment, developed countries have a shared but heavier responsibility in working towards 
sustainable development.18 This concretely translates in differential treatments and differentiated legal 
commitments, with developed countries endorsing heavier sustainable development commitments than 
developing countries. Developed countries are also to carry out technology and financial transfers in 
favour of developing countries to support their sustainable development efforts. Such measures find 
expression in the Rio Declaration,19 as well as in various sustainable development treaty regimes. For 
example, the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) fully endorses the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities.20 The treaty regime it sets up is wholly based on a duality of 
norms according to the Contracting Parties’ development level, and developed Parties specifically 
                                                            
16 See Boyle & Freestone, ‘Introduction’, in International Law and Sustainable Development... supra note 6, at 10-
12. 
17 Fitzmaurice, ‘International Protection of the Environment’, 293 Recueil des Cours (2001) 9, at 52; ILA, Toronto 
Conference (2006), International Law on Sustainable Development, at 2.  
18 Embodied in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration. 
19 See Principles 7, 9, 11, 5 and 6. 
20 See UNFCCC Art. 3(1) and 4(1). See also Art. 7 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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commit to financial and technology transfers in favour of developing Parties.21  Intergenerational equity 
for its part informs the principles of sustainable use of natural resources, of prevention and precaution, 
of environmental impact assessment, as well as of access to information and participation in the 
decision-making process. These are all reflected in the Rio Declaration,22 but also find expression in 
various treaty regimes closely connected to sustainable development such as the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the 1998 Aarhus Convention and the 1991 Espoo Convention. However, any list of 
principles and standards that need to be respected in order to achieve sustainable development cannot 
be exhaustive. This is because of the concept’s intrinsically evolutive nature. 
 
D. Intrinsically evolutive nature 
 
Sustainable development is not a static concept, and what needs to be done to achieve it 
evolves according to circumstances and in particular according to the time, the area, or the subjects 
concerned. What is sustainable development will vary in time as sustainable development is not 
immune to social, environmental or scientific evolutions. The range of standards and principles that 
need to be respected in view of sustainable development depends on these evolutions and need to 
adapt accordingly. Such temporal variability of the content of sustainable development is also an implicit 
requirement of the principle of intergenerational equity, which by nature, demands the adoption of a 
long-term perspective. Sustainable development hence inherently varies ratione temporis. What it 
requires will also depend on the characteristics of the State concerned and particularly its financial and 
technological capabilities. As noted earlier, intragenerational equity implies common but differentiated 
responsibilities in the pursuit of sustainable development as well as a modulation of commitments 
based on States’ capabilities and levels of development. The standards that need to be respected in the 
pursuit of sustainable development will thus vary according to whom they apply and the same level of 
commitment as that of a developed state will not be required of a developing one. Accordingly, some 
principles informing the content of sustainable development may only be applicable in certain contexts 
and to certain subjects only. For example, it might be inappropriate to expect a developing country to 
abide by the precautionary principle to the same extent as a developed state or to commit to financial 
and technology transfers. The contents of sustainable development thus vary ratione personae. They 
also vary ratione materiae. Whereas forest or fisheries management will primarily require the respect of 
the principle of sustainable use of natural resources, a railway development project will call for an 
environmental impact assessment, respect of the principle of prevention as well as information and 
participation of the public in the decision-making process. Depending on the area or type of activity 
concerned, some standards seen as necessary to achieve sustainable development will thus apply in 
priority where others will only have a secondary impact. This variability of the standards making up 
sustainable development means that variability is inherent to the concept itself. Because it is intrinsically 
evolutive its contents are difficult, if not impossible to strictly identify. Such malleability has 
understandably generated criticism. The vagueness of the concept and the impossibility to precisely 
                                                            
21 See UNFCCC Art. 4(3) and Art. 11(2)(b) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
22 See Principles 2, 10, 15 and 17. 
6 
 
define it or clearly identify its component parts has led some to conclude that it is empty of substance or 
incapable of legal classification. However it is argued that the evolutive nature of sustainable 
development, rather than being a weakness, represents the strength of the concept. To be able to 
function, the contents of sustainable development must evolve, the specificities of each situation and 
each circumstances must be taken into account, and this inherent malleability is not an obstacle to 
sustainable development’s legal classification. 
 
 
2. Legal nature of sustainable development 
 
Sustainable development’s legal nature is dependent upon two preconditions: its legal scope, 
and its penetration in one of the recognised sources of international law. There is little disagreement 
that a proposition can only be of a legal nature if it is formulated so as to have legal effects, or in other 
words, that it is legal in scope. For Virally, a proposition will have a legal scope when it is formulated 
‘with the intention to modify … elements of the existing legal order, or … that its implementation 
effectively achieves this result’.23 From this standpoint, sustainable development, as a proposition, is 
clearly legal in scope. The Rio Declaration - the structuring reference for sustainable development - is 
formulated in terms of rights and obligations and uses prescriptive language throughout. This also 
applies to a large proportion of binding and non-binding documents which include a proposition relating 
to sustainable development.24 Such propositions are mostly formulated with the intention to produce 
legal effects within the international legal order. However, the legal scope of a proposition, in and of 
itself, is not sufficient to make it law. This proposition must also be recognised as binding, it must be a 
valid rule of law, and traditionally, a rule will only be recognised as valid if it emanates from one of the 
sources of international law, notably conventions, custom and general principles of law.25 Only then will 
it be recognised as a positive norm of international law. So the question that needs answering is 
whether propositions relating to sustainable development have penetrated these sources of 
international law and have given rise to valid rules of law. 
 
A. Sustainable development and written international law 
 
Sustainable development has, over the last 30 years, received wide support in a vast array of 
non-binding international legal documents. It finds expression in countless Declaration of States, 
resolutions of international organisations, programmes of action, or codes of conduct.26 To the extent 
that these various instruments are not recognised among the formal sources of international law, they 
                                                            
23 Virally ‘Le rôle des “principes” dans le développement du droit international’, in Recueil d’études de droit 
international en hommage à Paul Guggenheim (1968) 531, at 535 (author’s translation). 
24 See infra this Section, A. 
25 As listed in art. 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.  
26 For an overview see V. Barral, ‘Le développement durable en droit international: Essai sur les incidences 
juridiques d’un concept évolutif’, (Ph.D on file at the EUI, Florence). 
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are incapable, in and of themselves, of giving rise to a valid legal rule relating to sustainable 
development, irrespective of the legal strength of their formulation.27 But sustainable development also 
finds expression in a far from negligible number of international treaties. It is included in over 300 
conventions and a brief survey of these is revealing from the point of view of the categories of 
conventions at stake, the location of the proposition relating to sustainable development, and the 
function attributed to it. Reference to sustainable development can indeed be found in 112 multilateral 
treaties, roughly 30 of which are aimed at universal participation.28 This points to a certain level of 
consensus of the international community as concerns the relevance of sustainable development for 
international law. But what is particularly significant about the inclusion of sustainable development in 
conventional law is the location of this inclusion. A common impression among international lawyers is 
that even though sustainable development receives recognition in a great number of treaties, this 
recognition is of little legal significance since such references are mainly confined to the preamble, 
which is not binding. However an empirical analysis shows that 207 of these references are to be found 
in the operative part of the convention which is technically binding on the parties. Closer study further 
reveals that for the most part sustainable development is laid out as an objective that contracting 
parties must strive to achieve, occasionally with an indication of the types of measures to be undertaken 
to that effect.29 
 
Clearly, then, sustainable development has widely penetrated treaty law. However, unlike in 
non-binding instruments such as the Rio Declaration, the formulation of provisions relating to 
sustainable development in formally binding international treaties can be rather flexible. The wording 
can be vague and imprecise, characterised by the use of the conditional and the provisions are often 
closer to laying down an incentive rather than purporting to be strictly constraining. For some, because 
of their softness, such provisions would be incapable of giving rise to valid rules of international law.30 
However the softness of the obligation laid down by a treaty provision should not be an obstacle to its 
validity and binding legal nature. For Weil the ‘caractère imprécis ou peu contraignant de certaines 
dispositions insérées dans des traités ... n’a rien à voir avec celle de leur caractère juridique.’31 He also 
argues that the many conventional provisions that lay down an incentive such as those where parties 
commit to ‘strive to’ or ‘promote’ are in and of themselves perfect legal rules, they are valid norms of 
international law.32 Following this line of thought, the softness of the provisions relating to sustainable 
development does not exclude them from being valid normative propositions, rather it just increases 
the margin of appreciation of the contracting parties in the execution of their obligations.33 Certainly in 
                                                            
27 Although they may still contribute to the formation of custom. 
28 Data set on file with the author. 
29 See infra Part 3A. 
30 See eg Baxter, ‘International Law “In Her Infinite Variety”’, 29 ICLQ (1980) 549, at 554. 
31 Weil, ‘Observations de M. Prosper Weil’, Annexe : Observations des membres de la Commission sur le rapport 
provisoire, 60-1 AIDI (1983) 366, at 370. 
32 See Weil ‘Vers une normativité relative en droit international? 82 RGDIP (1982) 5, at 8.   
33 See Virally ‘La distinction entre textes internationaux ayant une portée juridique dans les relations mutuelles 
entre leurs auteurs et textes qui en sont dépourvus’, 60 AIDI (1983) 328, at 331-336. 
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most cases conventional provisions relating to sustainable development are too soft to lay down an 
obligation on States to develop sustainably.34 But they may still lay down an obligation on states to 
‘strive to achieve’ or ‘promote’ sustainable development. Such an obligation, an obligation of means,35 
far from being deprived of normative character is just a norm with a different object, not one that 
requests a result to be achieved, but only means to be put in place to try and achieve this result. Such 
conventional provisions can clearly grant sustainable development its normativity. The relative effect of 
treaties however means that any conventional provision relating to sustainable development will, in 
principle, only be binding on the parties to this agreement. To ascertain whether sustainable 
development benefits from a general normative reach, it must find reflection in customary international 
law. 
 
B. Sustainable development and customary international law 
 
Academic objection to the existence of a general rule of customary international law relating to 
sustainable development has been fierce and based on a variety of arguments. If some see enough 
evidence of opinio juris and state practice to prove the existence of a customary rule, be it a very 
abstract and general one that requires case by case concretization,36 others elude this difficult question 
by emphasizing that the relevance of sustainable development is to be found elsewhere than in its legal 
nature,37 and notably on the influence it exerts on international law as a new branch of this discipline.38 
Yet another stream of commentary denies that sustainable development has reached the stage of a 
customary norm or is even capable of it.39 The most powerful objection to sustainable development’s 
customary status has been articulated by Lowe for whom, ‘there is, in the catalogue of treaty provisions, 
declarations and so on that use the term ‘sustainable development’, a lack of clear evidence that the 
authors regarded the concept as having the force of a rule or principle of customary international law.’40 
And that is because ‘the concept of sustainable development is inherently incapable of having the status 
... of a rule of law addressed to States and purporting to constrain their conduct’.41 Lowe reaches this 
conclusion because treaty and other provisions relating to sustainable development lack fundamentally 
norm-creating character and cannot, as such, form the basis of a general rule of international law. In his 
view only a formulae such as ‘States must develop sustainably’ would have this character.42 It is 
apparent from the foregoing that when commentators assess sustainable development’s customary 
                                                            
34 As argued by Lowe supra note 6 at 24-25. 
35 See infra part 3B. 
36 See Dupuy supra note 5 at 886; Maljean Dubois & Mehdi, ‘Environnement et développement, Les Nations Unies 
à la recherche d’un nouveau paradigme’, in Les Nations Unies et la protection de l’environnement: La promotion 
d’un développement durable, S. Maljean-Dubois & R. Mehdi (eds.) (2000) 9, at 21. 
37 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 17 at 60.  
38 See supra note 5.  
39 See Boyle & Freestone supra note 16 at 7. 
40 Lowe, supra note 6, at 24. 
41 Ibid, at 23. 
42 Ibid, at 25. 
9 
 
nature they look for an answer to the question: is there a general obligation to develop sustainably? And 
certainly the answer is no. The flexible formulations relating to sustainable development mean that 
evidence of opinio juris and state practice of an obligation to develop sustainably are impossible to 
ascertain. However to conclude that there is no such general obligation does not mean that sustainable 
development does not find reflection in custom. Such customary character can indeed flow from a 
positive answer to a different question: is there an obligation to implement measures aimed at 
achieving sustainable development? Or, is there a general obligation to promote sustainable 
development? A positive answer to these questions would only affect the normative category 
(obligations of means rather than of result) sustainable development belongs to, not its normative 
nature.  
 
The international lawyer searching for the customary nature of a legal proposition naturally 
turns to case-law for support, as judicial assertions, in ensuring the law’s foreseeability, offer a degree of 
security for legal subjects. Judicial assertions thus radiate much beyond the parties to the case,43 and 
because the existence of custom is so difficult to prove, the authority of judicial decisions is even more 
pronounced with respect to customary international law.44 But because of the special authority 
endowed to their assertions, international judges are also wary not to recognise the existence of custom 
too readily. To maintain their authority, their decisions must remain acceptable to the States. This 
caution exercised by international judges equally applies for sustainable development’s potential 
customary nature.  Although the relevance for international law of sustainable development has been 
acknowledged by judicial or arbitral decisions, judges and arbitrators have not gone so far as to clearly 
recognise its customary nature, although they have come close to it on one occasion. In the Shrimp-
Turtle case the WTO’s Appellate Body recognised the relevance of sustainable development for solving 
the dispute and even drew specific legal consequences from it, but fell short of a customary 
recognition.45 The legal implications of sustainable development were drawn in a strictly conventional 
capacity, because of the inclusion of this objective in the WTO Agreement’s preamble.  Crucially, the ICJ 
recognised the significance of sustainable development independently of its inclusion in a treaty. It did 
so for the first time in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case where it decided that since this economic treaty 
between Hungary and Slovakia was still in force, it had to be implemented. But current norms of 
international environmental law had to be taken into consideration by the parties in doing so, because 
of the need to reconcile economic development with environmental protection which the Court thought 
was ‘aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development’.46 In the Pulp Mills case47 the Court 
made some limited but interesting comments as to the legal implications of sustainable development. It 
                                                            
43 As confirmed by article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute. 
44 See Jennings, ‘What is International Law and How Do We Tell It When We See It?’ 37 Annuaire suisse de droit 
international (1981) 58, at 74. 
45 See United States – Import Prohibition of certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AV/R, 1998 at para 127-
131 and infra Part 4B. 
46 Supra note 1, at para 140 in fine. 
47 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, ICJ, Judgment, 20 April 2010. 
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recalled its earlier findings in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case,48 and went a step further by ascertaining 
that the object of article 27 of the Statute of the River Uruguay (which Argentina claimed Uruguay had 
breached) was ‘consistent with the objective of sustainable development’.49 Although this fell short of 
granting it customary nature, sustainable development is now more than just a concept, but an 
objective, and an objective with which a specific state conduct (that defined in article 27) must be 
consistent.  Unsurprisingly, it is an arbitral tribunal rather than the ICJ that has taken the boldest step 
towards the recognition of a customary status to sustainable development. In the Iron Rhine case the 
Tribunal was of the view that international law today ‘require(s) the integration of appropriate 
environmental measures in the design and implementation of economic development activities’, and 
that this integration requirement means that ‘where development may cause significant harm to the 
environment there is a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate, such harm’, which ‘has now become a 
principle of general international law’.50 By recalling paragraph 140 of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, 
the arbitral tribunal also leaves a strong impression that sustainable development and integration of 
environmental measures in economic development projects are the two facets of the same coin, which 
would also suggest that on this occasion, the arbitral tribunal did indeed accept the customary nature of 
sustainable development.  
 
In the absence of clear judicial recognition of its customary nature, it can still be tested whether 
sustainable development meets customary requirements which, according to article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ 
Statute, are the existence of a general practice (state practice) accepted as law (opinio juris). Whereas 
traditionally customs come to be formed because the constancy of the conduct of states results in their 
belief that such conduct has become obligatory, as far as sustainable development is concerned, as well 
as most modern international environmental law, States first come to believe in the necessity to create 
the rule, rather than in its existence. For René-Jean Dupuy the creation of a ‘wild custom’,51 can result 
from the will of legal subjects to give rise to a new rule. Negotiation and close adoption and re-adoption 
of similar rules will eventually lead to the ‘impregnation of legal mentalities’,52 and the practice of states 
thus follows rather than precedes the formation of opinio juris. States’ opinio juris as to the binding 
nature of sustainable development can thus result from the wealth of resolutions, declarations, 
gentlemen’s agreements, programmes of action, international and national judicial decisions, national 
legislations, and conventional provisions referring to it. At least in so far as these formulations are in the 
form of sufficiently similar legal rules. Clearly provisions relating to sustainable development vary 
sometimes greatly from one instrument to the other. However, there is still an overarching coherence 
                                                            
48 At para 76. 
49 At para 177. 
50 Award in the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium and 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 27 RIAA (2005) 35, at para 59. 
51 Dupuy, ‘Coutume sage et coutume sauvage’, in Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau: La communauté 
internationale (1974) 75. For this author a wild custom is one that is the result of legal politics rather than belief 
but also one that can crystallize over a much shorter period of time.  
52 See Dupuy (P-M) ‘Théorie des sources et coutume en droit international contemporain’ in Le droit international 
dans un monde en mutation (1994) 51, at 65 (author’s translation). 
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between them as sustainable development is almost always defined as an objective to tend to. These 
many legal acts also constitute useful precedents in the formation of a general practice relating to this 
opinio juris, to the extent that states’ conduct is in line with them. States do constantly and generally53 
adopt national sustainable development strategies, report to the Commission on Sustainable 
Development, design development projects that take into account environmental considerations, 
implement environmental impact assessments with a view to achieving sustainable development. 
Obviously these actions lack uniformity which is an essential requirement for precedents to form 
meaningful state practice.54 However sustainable development itself requires various types of conduct 
to be adopted, because it is an objective, because it is intrinsically evolutive, and because as an 
obligation of means it requires a series of different types of efforts towards the fulfillment of the 
objective it lays down. Hence, conduct aimed at achieving sustainable development, even if lacking 
uniformity, can still form valid precedents constituting evidence of the existence of a general practice of 
states. Despite clear judicial confirmation it can thus be concluded that sustainable development, as an 
objective, already constitutes a principle of customary law, even if this principle is a very general one, 
with a high degree of abstraction and which requires case by case substantiation. 
 
 
3. Substantive operation of sustainable development as an international legal norm 
 
A. Sustainable development as an interstitial norm? 
 
In a thought-provoking contribution reacting to arguments that it was a customary principle, 
Lowe has offered an analysis of sustainable development’s normative character according to which it 
cannot be a primary rule but can claim a normative status as an element of the judicial reasoning 
process. For Lowe it is ‘a meta-principle, acting upon other legal rules and principles – a legal concept 
exercising a kind of interstitial normativity, pushing and pulling the boundaries of true primary norms 
when they threaten to overlap or conflict with each other.’55 Lowe’s interstitial norms operate as 
modifying norms which ‘do not seek to regulate the conduct of legal persons directly’56 but rather 
establish the relationship between primary norms (those which regulate conduct). Examples of such 
norms, alongside sustainable development, include the rule of reason, the balancing of interest or the 
reasonable man test, which are ‘aspects of the primary rules upon which they are parasitic’ but which 
have ‘a vitality beyond any specific primary rule. They are free agents, which may in principle be 
combined with any other rule, modifying that rule’.57 As a modifying or interstitial norm, sustainable 
development may be employed as a standard against which conduct will be measured and it is as a tool 
                                                            
53 Consistency and generality being two essential conditions for precedents to contribute to the formation of state 
practice. 
54 See The Case of the SS “Lotus”, 1927 PCJI Series A, No. 10, at 21. 
55 Lowe, supra note 6 at 31. 




in the hands of judges that it acquires its normativity. It is capable of affecting the outcome of cases by 
‘colouring the understanding of the norms that it modifies’.58 On this analysis, sustainable development 
would be a purely hermeneutical judicial tool  empty of any binding content purporting to regulate legal 
subjects’ conduct. 
 
There is little doubt that sustainable development is perceived as an objective for the 
international community. It has been qualified as such by the ICJ in the Pulp Mills case, and by the vast 
majority of treaties referencing it. In many of these sustainable development is directly defined as an 
objective,59 in others it is one because state parties undertake to ‘promote’, ‘achieve’ or ‘reach’, 
‘ensure’, ‘contribute to’, ‘favour’, ‘work towards’ sustainable development.60 As an objective to reach, a 
specific conduct must be adopted and certain measures must be put in place. There is indeed little 
disagreement that sustainable development requires intra and intergenerational equity as well as the 
integration of environmental considerations in economic development projects. Consequently on the 
one hand, despite the flexible and variable content of sustainable development, some core elements 
remain irrespective of the situation it purports to apply to. As a result, its indeterminate character will 
be very sensibly less than that of what is ‘reasonable’ (one example of Lowe’s interstitial norms) whose 
material implications in the assessment of a delay spent in bringing a claim will bear no relationship to 
its application for the assessment of measures for the protection of aliens. On the other hand, as an 
objective, sustainable development aims to regulate conduct. Its primary object is not to regulate the 
relationship between primary norms, it may have this function, but only as a corollary to its main 
function. Its primary object is to set an objective to legal subjects and thus to regulate their conduct. 
Whether the necessary conduct has been adopted to reach this objective can also be tested against the 
core constitutive elements of sustainable development. Because it is an objective which has a flexible 
but identifiable material content, at least to some extent, it cannot be a simple accessory to primary 
rules having a strictly procedural or hermeneutical function. To the contrary, it is capable and it purports 
to directly regulate conduct and has properly material and direct legal implications. It is a primary norm 
of international law. 
 
B. Sustainable development as an obligation of means 
 
Rules that tend to regulate conduct (Hart’s primary rules),61 may be of several types. Obligations 
of means are a familiar category of norms for legal systems derived from Roman law. Unlike obligations 
of result, which require the achievement of the result defined by the obligation, obligations of means 
                                                            
58 Ibid, at 34. 
59 Examples include the UNFCCC; the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean; the Danube 
River Protection Convention; the ACP-CE Cotonou Agreement; the MERCOSUR; the WTO Agreement; or the Energy 
Charter Treaty. 
60 See respectively the Convention on Biological Diversity art. 8(e); the Convention to Combat Drought and 
Desertification art. 2(b); The Kyoto Protocol art. 2(1); the European Landscape Convention preamble para 2; the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement art. 1(c). 
61 See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., (1994) ch.V. 
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only require the deployment of all possible means to achieve the result, without promising to achieve 
it.62 An obligation of means will consequently be breached only when the promised efforts have not 
been accomplished since ‘what defines the object of the obligation is the tension towards the objective, 
and not its achievement’.63 If the subject only needs to endeavour to achieve the result, rather than be 
under an absolute obligation to attain it, it is because in the case of obligations of means, the 
achievement of this result is more unpredictable, and not fully under the subject’s control. It thus only 
contains a duty of best efforts,64 a category of obligations known to international law as ‘due diligence’ 
obligations.65 
 
Both in treaty law and in general international law, sustainable development is understood as an 
objective that legal subjects must tend to achieve, and the object of an obligation of means is precisely 
to tend to achieve an objective. This objective, that is the result hoped for, works, for Combacau, as a 
teleological reference permitting the evaluation of whether the means deployed adequately fulfil the 
obligation.66 Accordingly, in relation to the objective of sustainable development, states are under an 
obligation to strive or do their best to achieve it. States are thus under a relative rather than absolute 
obligation to achieve sustainable development, they are not bound to achieve it, but are bound to try to, 
they are bound to promote sustainable development. There is some indication in case law and 
codification works that sustainable development should be understood as a relative obligation. In the 
Ogoni People case the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights found that in relation to 
article 24 of the Charter, States had to adopt reasonable measures to inter alia ensure an ecologically 
sustainable development.67 The reference to reasonable measures suggests that the obligation is a 
relative one. This reading is confirmed by the ILA which has explained that: 
 
Sustainability is not an absolute obligation. The varied circumstances of human need and water 
availability are too complex to allow one to declare an absolute obligation of sustainability. Moreover, in 
too many situations whether a particular use is sustainable will be highly debatable. Rather than 
attempt to lay down a theoretically absolute obligation that often will be breached in practice, this Rule 
identifies an obligation to take appropriate measures to assure sustainability – a due diligence obligation 
to which States can be expected to conform.68 
                                                            
62 See eg Ph. Mallaurie and L. Aynès, Droit civil, les obligations (2005), at 492. 
63 Combacau, ‘Obligations de résultat et obligations de comportement. Quelques questions et pas de réponse’, in 
Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter. Le droit international : unité et diversité (1981) 181, at 194 (author’s translation). 
64 See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, “Due diligence” e responsabilità internazionale degli Stati, (1989), at 286 and 354-382; the 
ILC’s ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with commentaries’, ILC 
Yearbook (2001) Vol. II part 2, at 153; and the ILC’s ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, with 
commentaries’, ILC Yearbook (2008), Vol. II part 2, comments to art. 6. 
65 See Reuter, ‘Principes de droit international public’, 103 Recueil des Cours (1961) 425 at 472 and 598. 
66 Combacau, supra note 63, at 194. 
67 Social and Economic Rights Action Center, Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 155/96 (2001), at para 52. 




Arguably however, the obligation to promote sustainable development does not fully conform 
to the structure of a ‘due diligence’ obligation in terms of the nature of the objective to be achieved. 
Due diligence obligations are essentially negative obligations, obligations to prevent something from 
happening, such as damage to aliens’ rights or to the environment. Conversely, the obligation to 
promote sustainable development is intrinsically positive. Legal subjects must adopt measures which 
tend to allow a change to happen, they must create the necessary conditions for a new situation to 
arise, a situation of sustainable development. The obligation of means to promote sustainable 
development is accordingly much closer to that of the doctor towards a patient. The doctor must strive 
to cure the patient, without being able to promise to succeed. He/she must however still create the 
necessary conditions for a new situation to occur: the cure of the patient.   
 
If the object of the norm relating to sustainable development is not to achieve it but to strive for 
it, then legal subjects are required to adopt conduct promoting sustainable development. As Boyle and 
Freestone put it ‘although international law may not require development to be sustainable, it does 
require development decisions to be the outcome of a process which promotes sustainable 
development'.69 As an objective, sustainable development must thus weigh upon the decision making 
process of legal subjects, they will notably have to try and achieve a balanced decision taking into 
account, environmental, economic and social considerations. A number of tools will also help measure 
the adequacy of the conduct states adopt in view of their promotion obligation. 
 
C. Measuring tools 
 
Whether the requirements of an obligation of means are met is generally assessed in abstracto 
via confrontation of the State’s conduct to a ‘standard conduct’ itself meeting those requirements. In 
international law, this standard conduct is that which is expected from a good government. The specific 
circumstances of each case will also be taken into consideration, including the level of development of 
the State.70 This will be particularly relevant for evaluating the fulfilment of States’ sustainable 
development obligations, the level of effort expected being in accordance with each State’s own 
capacities. Beyond these general assessment criteria some are specific to the obligation to promote 
sustainable development. Despite its flexible nature, at a minimum it requires intra and 
intergenerational equity as well as the integration of environmental considerations into economic 
development projects. This means that an identifiable list of measures will normally be expected from 
states in the fulfilment of their obligation to promote sustainable development which will include inter 
alia precaution, prevention, sustainable use, inclusive decision making, financial and technology 
transfers, or poverty eradication. But because of sustainable development’s variable and intrinsically 
                                                            
69 Boyle & Freestone, supra note 16, at 17. 
70 See ILC’s ‘Draft Articles on Prevention …’, supra note 64, at 154-155 which interestingly bases itself on principles 
11 and 23 of the Rio Declaration to justify such differentiation. 
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evolutive nature, this list of measures will vary according to time and circumstances; it will vary and 
adapt ratione materiae, temporis, personae and loci. 
 
Although this implies an indeterminate list of measures that must be adhered to, some of those 
have already been singled out by the international judge. The Iron Rhine Arbitral Tribunal closely 
associated sustainable development with the principle of integration and added that this principle 
required the prevention and mitigation of environmental damage when undertaking an economic 
development project, thus suggesting that to ensure sustainable development a State will have to 
prevent and mitigate damage to the environment.71 The ICJ also suggests in the Pulp Mills case that 
sustainable development implies the cooperation of the parties in the prevention of environmental 
damage. After stating that the use of the river should ‘allow for sustainable development’ it then reads 
the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros judgment as if the duty of the parties to find an agreed solution was 
connected to sustainable development and adds that ‘it is by cooperating that the states concerned can 
jointly manage the risks of damage to the environment’.72 Ultimately, this indicated that beyond the 
duty to prevent environmental damage, sustainable development also includes a duty to cooperate.  
 
The range of measures that States must conform to in order to fulfil their obligation to promote 
sustainable development may also be more circumscribed in treaty law, ie when it is the object of a 
conventional obligation. This is because the parties to the treaty may choose to reduce the 
indeterminate nature of the types of conduct expected by specifying a range of standards to be 
conformed to. The Kyoto Protocol thus provides in its article 2(1)(a) that in order to promote sustainable 
development the contracting Parties listed in annex I shall ‘Implement and/or further elaborate policies 
and measures in accordance with its national circumstances, such as’ inter alia enhancement of energy 
efficiency; promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture; or use of new and renewable forms of energy. 
Another example is that of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean, which, in 
its article 4(3) provides that in order to protect the environment and contribute to sustainable 
development the Parties shall apply the precautionary principle according to their capabilities; the 
polluter pays principle; undertake environmental impact assessments; promote cooperation; and 
promote the integrated management of coastal zones. 
 
Sustainable development thus imposes an obligation of means on legal subjects, an obligation to 
strive to achieve or promote it. The measuring tools for evaluating the fulfilment of this obligation will 
vary according to the circumstances of each case, but the essential conceptual content of sustainable 
development commands that, at a minimum, States will have to integrate environmental considerations 
into economic development projects, prevent damage to the environment and cooperate in doing so. 
Additionally, conventional obligations relating to sustainable development may constrain state conduct 
                                                            
71 See supra Part 2B. 
72 Supra note 47, at para 75-77. 
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further by specifying the measures that will need to be adopted in fulfilment of their obligation. Finally, 
sustainable development may also exert its influence upon the  interpretative process. 
 
 
4. Interpretative function of sustainable development 
 
As a primary rule of law, the objective of sustainable development may be referred to by the 
judge in the interpretation of other customary or conventional rules. It is well recognised that judges, in 
interpreting a rule, may rely upon other rules so long as they are relevant.73 Sustainable development 
may thus have a hermeneutical function whether as a customary principle or as a conventional rule, and 
its characteristics make it a particularly useful interpretative tool. The more flexible and vague the 
content of the rule used as a hermeneutical reference, the wider the margin of appreciation for the 
judge in determining the sense of the rule interpreted. Because sustainable development is a notion 
whose content varies, its elasticity grants the judge an appreciable degree of liberty, authorising value or 
circumstantial choices to be made. It is therefore a valuable hermeneutical tool weighing upon the 
interpretation of other rules. 
 
A. Sustainable development as an external hermeneutical reference  
 
Beyond sustainable development’s natural interpretative function when it is included in either 
the preamble or the material provisions of the treaty to be interpreted,74 even absent a conventional 
reference it may still inform treaty interpretation since according to article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ must 
be taken into account in the interpretative process. Accordingly, as a principle of customary 
international law, or as an extraneous conventional rule, sustainable development can influence the 
interpretation of treaty provisions so long as it is relevant for such interpretation and applicable in the 
relations between the parties.75 The impact of an interpretative reference to sustainable development 
via article 31(3)(c) remains however unclear. Sands, commenting in the WTO context, is of the view that 
it means that a conventional provision ‘is to be interpreted consistently with general international law, 
and … the customary rule is to apply unless it can be shown that such application would undermine the 
object and purpose of the WTO system’.76 The conclusions of the ILC’s Study Group on the 
fragmentation of international law remain however much more elusive, perhaps to preserve the judge’s 
                                                            
73 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  Art. 31(3)(c) and Georges Pinson (France) v United Mexican States, 
5 RIAA (1928) 327, at 422. 
74 On this point see Barral, ‘Le rayonnement intra-systémique du concept de développement durable’ in La 
circulation des concepts juridiques : Le droit international de l’environnement entre mondialisation et 
fragmentation, H. Ruiz Fabri & L. Gradoni (eds) (2009), 371 at 373-379. 
75 See McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, 54 ICLQ 
(2005) 279 at 314-315. 
76 Sands, ‘Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of International Law’, in 
International Law and Sustainable Development..., supra note 6, at 59. 
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margin of appreciation.77 Lastly, the usefulness of article 31(3)(c) in allowing sustainable development to 
play a role in treaty interpretation may be further limited by the principle of ‘contemporaneity’ 
according to which a treaty must be interpreted in the context of the law applicable at the time of its 
conclusion.78 That is unless the parties agree otherwise and decide to allow the interpretation of the 
treaty to follow modern legal developments.79 
 
B. Sustainable development and evolutive interpretation 
 
The Parties to a convention may choose to include ‘evolutive’ terms in the treaty. By doing so 
they open the treaty to a dynamic or ‘evolutive’ interpretation, that is to an interpretation in the light of 
the law in force at the time of the dispute, in the light of current norms of international law, and not 
only of the law in force at the time of conclusion of the treaty.80 The opening up of the agreement by the 
inclusion of evolutive terms will allow the judge, through a ‘mobile reference’,81 to determine the sense 
of conventional provisions consistently with current norms of international law that did not necessarily 
exist at the time of its conclusion, and may go as far as allowing the incorporation of such norms into the 
treaty.82 By its very nature sustainable development is an evolutive proposition. As an objective it 
implies constant and continuous efforts; at the same time, what is seen as sustainable will change over 
time, and according to physical, social, environmental, economic, scientific or other evolutions. Inclusion 
of sustainable development in a treaty thus necessarily opens up this agreement to its potential 
evolutive interpretation. 
 
The Shrimp-Turtle case is an excellent example of the Appellate Body using sustainable 
development as a legitimising factor for evolutive treaty interpretation. The drafting history of article 
XX(g) GATT indicated that the term ‘exhaustible’ natural resources was associated with non-living 
resources, 83 thus a priori excluding sea turtles from its protection. However, for the Appellate Body, the 
words of Article XX(g) ‘must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the 
community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment.’84 And that is because 
the WTO Agreement preamble showed that its signatories ‘were, in 1994, fully aware of the importance 
and legitimacy of environmental protection as a goal of national and international policy’ as this 
                                                            
77 See Report of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 2006, 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, at 361-362 para 474.  
78 See Island of Palmas case (Netherlands, USA), II RIAA (1928) 829, at 845 and 839. 
79 See ILC Commentaries to the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook (1966) 187, at 242 para 16. 
80 See Georgopoulos, ‘Le droit intertemporel et les dispositions conventionnelles évolutives. Quelle thérapie contre 
la vieillesse des traités ?’, 108 RGDIP (2004) 123, at 130.  
81 Expression borrowed from the Separate Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui to the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, ICJ 
Reports (1997) 120 at 122. 
82 See supra note 1, at para 112. 
83 See supra note 45, at para 127. 
84 Ibid, at para 129. 
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preamble ‘explicitly acknowledges "the objective of sustainable development"’.85 Sustainable 
development thus justifies exhaustible natural resources being interpreted in the light of contemporary 
environmental concerns and modern scientific knowledge, especially that it was ‘the perspective 
embodied in the preamble’ that led the Appellate Body to conclude that ‘the generic term "natural 
resources" in Article XX(g) is not "static" in its content or reference but is rather "by definition, 
evolutionary"’.86 Ultimately, current rules of international environmental law and modern biology 
indicated that the term exhaustible natural resources could not be restricted to non-living resources and 
had to be read as including sea turtles.  Because of its evolutive nature sustainable development thus 
authorized the evolutive interpretation of Article XX(g).  
 
C. Sustainable development and conflict of norms 
 
Since at a minimum sustainable development requires the integration of environmental 
considerations in economic and social development projects it will also be a useful tool for judges to 
resolve disputes where such considerations and related legal norms are in tension. In these 
circumstances, reference to sustainable development will allow a balancing exercise to be carried out 
and it will work as a criterion for solving a conflict of norms, a rule of conflict resolution. It is this role 
that the ICJ attributes to sustainable development in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros. In this dispute Hungary was 
mainly motivated by environmental concerns (the impact of the construction of the dams) whereas 
Slovakia wanted to carry out a project fuelling economic development. For the Court, since sustainable 
development ‘aptly expresses’ the need to reconcile economic development with protection of the 
environment the parties must find an agreed solution to give effect to the Treaty. In doing so they need 
to ‘look afresh at the effects on the environment of the operation of the Gabčíkovo power plant’87 and 
‘in order to evaluate the environmental risks, current standards must be taken into consideration.’88 
Sustainable development here requires a balancing of opposite considerations, a balancing of 
environmental considerations against the duty to give effect to a treaty in force requiring the 
construction of the dams, according to the pacta sunt servanda rule. For Vice President Weeramantry, 
this balancing function was the essential role of sustainable development89 and the Court used it as a 
mechanism for ‘bridging two views without necessarily having to provide close reasoning as to method 
or outcome.’90 
 
Sustainable development is used as a rule of conflict resolution again in the Iron Rhine case 
where it was used to moderate the harsh effects of a strict application of the terms of an old treaty. 
                                                            
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid, at para 130. 
87 Supra note 1, at para 141. 
88 Ibid, at para 140. 
89 See Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry to the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, ICJ Reports (1997) 88, 
at 88-90. 
90 Sands, ‘International Courts and the Application of the concept of ‘Sustainable Development’’, 3 Max Planck 
YBUNL (1999) 389, at 396. 
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According to an 1839 Treaty of Separation, Belgium maintained a right of transit through Dutch territory 
and based itself on this to request the reactivation of the Iron Rhine railway line. The Netherlands 
argued that such reactivation had to be subject to a range of environmental protection measures,  not 
envisaged by the Treaty. Despite the treaty silence, the Tribunal concluded that since sustainable 
development and the principle of integration require the prevention and mitigation of environmental 
damage in carrying out economic development projects, Dutch environmental protection measures 
were legitimate and had to be integrated in the project,91 thus balancing opposing interests in favour of 
environmental considerations. But the Tribunal used sustainable development again to mitigate the 
effect of its own conclusions. Under article XII of the Treaty the costs of a new line were to be borne by 
Belgium. For the Tribunal, although the programmed works did not amount to the building of a new line, 
their particularly wide scale meant that they should still come under article XII.92 In principle then the 
burden of the costs lay upon Belgium, including the costs of environmental protection measures. But the 
need to reconcile economic and environmental considerations expressed by sustainable development 
and embodied by the principle of integration is used again to mitigate these harsh financial 
consequences.93 Because both parties pursue legitimate interests, ‘the costs are not to be borne solely 
by Belgium as if it were a new road; but neither are they to be borne solely by the Netherlands. The 
financial obligations of the Parties must therefore be subjected to careful balancing.’94 Sustainable 
development thus legitimizes the balancing and rebalancing of both parties’ interests and mitigates their 
effect on the law. 
 
D. Sustainable development and redefinition of conventional obligations 
 
Sustainable development can finally be used in the interpretative process to assist the 
redefinition of conventional obligations. This is arguably its most controversial hermeneutical function 
as it may lead to treaty revision. When this is the result of a decision by the Parties to the agreement it is 
perfectly legitimate, but it is less so when this decision is made by the judge. In the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros case, the necessity to reconcile economic development and environmental protection 
expressed by sustainable development meant that the scope of old treaty provisions had to be 
renegotiated by the parties to make them compatible with current standards.95  The Court decided that 
conventional obligations had to be redefined, yet this conclusion was acceptable as it remained the 
parties’ responsibility.  In the Pulp Mills case the ICJ also went as far as redefining the terms of article 27 
of the Statute of the River on the basis of sustainable development, although this did not lead to 
immediate legal consequences. Article 27 provides that ‘the right of each Party to use the waters of the 
river … shall be exercised without prejudice to the application of the procedure laid down in articles 7 to 
12 when the use is liable to affect the régime of the river or the quality of its waters’. Unsurprisingly for 
                                                            
91 See supra note 50 at para 59, 222 and 223. 
92 Ibid, at 84. 
93 Ibid, at para 221. 
94 Ibid, at para 220. 
95 Supra note 1, at 83, 2B. 
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a Treaty concluded in 1975, this provision makes no mention of sustainable development, yet for the 
Court, it is this objective that it translates. Indeed, in the Court’s view, article 27 ‘reflects … the need to 
strike a balance between the use of the waters and the protection of the river consistent with the 
objective of sustainable development’ and adds that it ‘embodies this interconnectedness between 
economic development and environmental protection that is the essence of sustainable development.’96 
Thus not only does the court read sustainable development into article 27 but it also redefines the 
meaning of this provision whose implementation must now be consistent with this objective; thus in 
effect, revising the Treaty. However, the Court fell short of deciding, despite Argentina’s arguments, 
whether article 27 had been breached.  The Iron Rhine Tribunal went a step further and arguably relied 
on sustainable development to ‘revise’ the treaty, and this time, with very substantial legal 
consequences. By deciding that the reactivation works fell under article XII, the arbitrators should have 
concluded that the costs were to be borne by Belgium. Yet, it is on the basis of the need for integration 
of environmental and economic concerns, as embodied by sustainable development, that the Tribunal 
decided to set aside the terms of article XII and redefine it to mean that the costs should be shared 
between the Parties. It thus went through extensive interpretative circumvolutions to conclude on the 
applicability of article XII only to then revise the consequences clearly attached to the article, and apply 





Sustainable development is undeniably a very powerful hermeneutical tool in the hands of 
judges, as it can be used to weigh on the interpretation of existing norms. Having resort to sustainable 
development in the interpretation process may not only legitimize a dynamic interpretation of treaty 
rules, but in certain circumstances lead the judge to go as far as revising the treaty. These outcomes are 
the result of the integration of, generally, environmental norms in a treaty that did not necessarily take 
them into account, as well as of the balancing exercise between conflicting norms and interests that 
sustainable development requires. Sustainable development’s interpretative function is thus particularly 
significant for the power and degree of liberty it grants judges. However, it is only rarely that disputes 
are brought before the judge, and however powerful the interpretative function may be, sustainable 
development cannot be limited to that function only. To do so would be to ignore its formalization as a 
primary rule of law aimed at regulating conduct in hundreds of treaties. As attractive as the judicial 
function may be, its quantitative role in the implementation of international law remains minimal. The 
primary enforcers of international norms remain the States themselves, and although sustainable 
development may be used by judges, it is not addressed to them. It is addressed to legal subjects, ie 
States. States are under an obligation to pursue sustainable development, they are bound by an 
obligation of means, and by implementing these countless treaties, they contribute, day after day, to 
progressively making sustainable development requirements real.  
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